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Parallels In Predicting DangerousnessWhat Price Security?*
Participants:
Professor Adele Bernhard, J.D.
Professor Vanessa Merton, J.D.
Henry J. Steadman, Ph.D.
Scott Rogge, M.D., J.D.
PROFESSOR MERTON:' One question is: why should an
employer have any duty to intervene, respond, or warn when an
employee is deemed "dangerous"? What expertise in making
these predictions can your average business manager bring to
the table? As lawyers we tend never to look at law that is more
than a week old. Similarly, scientists prefer not to rely on sci2
ence that is more than a few months old. Yet, here is an article
written almost 20 years ago when I was a young Associate for
Law at the Hastings Center for a symposium honoring the great
forensic psychiatrist Dr. Jonas Robitscher, whom I had the
pleasure of working with there.
* This Panel Discussion was part of a special program presented on April 8,
1999, by Pace University School of Law with Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Division of Law and Psychiatry at Pace University School of Law, entitled Playing
the Psychiatric Odds: Can We Protect the Public by PredictingDangerousness?
1. Vanessa Merton is Associate Dean for Clinical Education and Professor of
Law at Pace University School of Law, where she teaches health law and directs
the clinical and externship programs. Professor Merton is also the Executive Director of John Jay Legal Services, the law school's free legal clinic, and co-founder
of the Access to Health Care, Health in the Workplace, and Prosecution of Domestic Violence Clinics. Professor Merton has lectured and published extensively on
issues of biomedical and legal ethics and on health issues of importance to women,
most recently domestic violence, the exclusion of women subjects from medical research, and the phenomenon of female genital mutilation. Professor Merton was
the founding chair of the Institutional Review Board of the Community Research
Initiative of New York, one of the first centers for community-based biomedical
research on AIDS, and the first Associate for Law at the Hastings Center Institute
for Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences. The honor of which she is most proud of
is being chosen as Outstanding Professor by the 1995 graduating class of Pace
University School of Law.
2. See Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous"Patient:Implications of Tarasofffor Psychiatristsand Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263 (1982).
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When in preparation for this meeting I began to update this
article, I assumed that the law and the science of violence prediction would have evolved substantially; I expected to see great
differences in both the quality of the scientific predictions and
the law of legal authority and responsibility for such predictions. However, I must say that I found very little change over
the last 20 years. Further, my own predictions about what
would be the effect of the Tarasoff3 decision have turned out to
4
be completely wrong.
Back in 1982, shortly after the Tarasoff decision, I was responding to the enormous sense of injustice among my colleagues in psychiatry and other mental health professions, who
felt that the law was terribly unfair, as well as very stupid, for
imposing any responsibility for poor predictions of violence on
them.
In fact, the mental health professions had bought into this
position of power, based on a claim of expertise-to be able to
predict violence-that the occupants of no other profession,
group, or role in our society have. The role conflict for mental
health professionals that was ascribed to the Tarasoffdecision
was not created by the law, but merely became embodied in the
5
law.
Psychiatrists and mental health professionals in this society function as agents of social control in a great variety of
ways. Perhaps the clearest example is death penalty jurisprudence6 which continues to utilize "scientific predictions" of future violent behavior. Dangerousness is admittedly a legal
construct rather than a clinical one. However, that kind of prediction can make the difference between life and death for a
3. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
4. See Merton, supra note 2, at 308-17; 322-25; 329-35.
5. See Merton, supra note 2, at 276.
6. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880 (1983); see also John C. Johnson, Survey of Developments in North Carolina
and the Fourth Circuit, 73 N.C. L. REv. (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, 1988 Survey
of Books Relating to the Law; Crime and Punishment: The Politics of Predicting
Criminal Violence, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1322 (1988); Robert J. Kane & George Sigel,
Violence PredictionRevisited, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CraM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 63
(1993); Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 3 CraM. JUST. 18
(1989).
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given individual in our legal system, and it can happen every
day.
In my original article I argued that if mental health professionals felt imposed upon and that Tarasoff represented an unfair, unjust, and unwise rule of law, then their recourse was
immediate, and a classic case of "Physician, heal thyself."7 If
they would renounce their claims to be able to make such predictions, it would become extremely difficult for the legal system
to try to hold them accountable for not making them.
The unanticipated consequences 8 flowing from the Tarasoff
decision that I feared were a little different from those most
voiced by psychiatrists. 9 One of my concerns was that the evidence enabling therapists to be sued for failing to predict violence, or failing to intervene appropriately after making a
prediction, may often come before the court when therapists cooperate by testifying in defense of a perpetrator. 10 Consequently, I thought therapists would be deterred from working
with criminal defense lawyers to present evidence of mental
problems that would have bearing on the guilt or innocence or
mitigation of punishment, of the person who had committed an
act of violence. That does not seem to have happened, in part
because of subsequent state legislation."
My second concern was that lawyers would be unwilling to
advise therapists confronted with Tarasoff-type issues, believing that they, the lawyers, would in turn be held responsible if
they gave therapists wrong advice about how to handle the situation. 12 The third issue that I anticipated was that the law
seemed, at that point, to contemplate imposing on the legal profession, quite gratuitously, the same responsibility that had
been imposed on psychiatrists. 3 That is, there were indications
at that time that lawyers might be held responsible for not revealing threats or otherwise failing to act in response to our
7. See Merton, supra note 2, at 267, 342.
8. See id. at 322-24, 334-38.
9. See id. at 298-300, 312.
10. See id. at 322-23.
11. See George C. Harris, The Dangerous PatientException to the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege:The TarasoffDuty and the Jaffe Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV.
33, 42-45, 48-49, 52-54 (1999), and authorities cited therein at notes 83 and 101.
12. See Merton, supra note 2, at 317.
13. See id. at 329-31, 335.
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dangerous clients. 14 As someone who at that time had been a
criminal defense lawyer for 10 years, had heard a lot of threats
from clients, had worried a lot and not known what to do about
it, this concept was highly salient to me and the idea of imposing that kind of ethical and legal responsibility on lawyers left
me feeling rather unequipped to respond.
Of course, lawyers had never claimed relevant expertise or
an ability to predict dangerousness. This expertise had never
been a part of our societal role. In fact, you could argue the
exact opposite. Our job is to speak for the patient or the client,
not speak about that person, and not to be objectively
descriptive.
What has happened, interestingly enough, in several
states, is that lawyers have done just that. We have imposed on
ourselves a quasi-Tarasoffduty: a mandatory, non-discretionary responsibility to act, 15 and in some cases to report credible
threats of imminent, serious physical injury. 16 Therefore, I
wondered whether there had been a burgeoning of case law.
Had disclosure been imposed on lawyers as a result? The one
decision that I have been able to find which moves in that direction is State of Washington v. Hansen.'7 Washington was also
the jurisdiction of the one comparable decision back in 1979,18
when I wrote the article, which was the first time a court suggested that lawyers could be accountable for failing to disclose a
risk of danger.' 9 That earlier court rebuffed the idea of
mandatory disclosure compelled by ethical or court rules, but
left open the possibility of a "common law duty to volunteer in14. See id.
15. See Standards Relating to the Admin. of Crim. Just., Standard 4-3.7(a),
A.B.A. SEC. ON CRIM. JUST. (2d ed. 1980) (proposed mandatory disclosure when
threat to endanger the safety of any person).
16. See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (a lawyer
shall reveal information necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily harm);
but see Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1998) (disclosure permitted but not required); see also Proposed NEW YORK DISCn'LINARY RULE 5-109(B)
(organization counsel has mandatory duty to reveal employee's violation of law to
highest authority within organization, but not outside organization), discussed in
Lazar Emanuel "The Misdeeds of Clients and the Lawyer's Response," New York
Professional Responsibility Report, Nov. 1999, at 5-6.
17. 826 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1993).
18. See Hawkins v. King County Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., 602 P.2d 361
(Wash. 1979).
19. See id. at 365.
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formation about a client to a court considering pretrial release
where information gained convinces counsel that his client in20
tends to... inflict injury upon unknowing third persons."
The Hansen decision involved a lawyer who received a
phone call from someone who had recently been released from
prison. 21 He was looking for a lawyer because he wanted to sue
the judge who had sentenced him, the prosecutor that prosecuted him, the lawyer who defended him, and everyone else involved. 22 When the lawyer he consulted stated that he did not
think that such lawsuits would be feasible, the caller's response
was, ".... [wihat I am going to do... I am going to get a gun and
blow them all away, the prosecutor, the judge and the public
defender." 23 Subsequently, the lawyer consulted his partner
and the local bar association, trying to decide the appropriate
course of action under the circumstances. 24 Finally, the lawyer
decided to call the judge and tell the judge that this comment
25
had been made in a phone call.
Now, talk about a basis for an accurate prediction of violence: the lawyer had never met or seen this person. He knew
nothing about him, except for the comment he made. It would
seem unlikely that a court would require a therapist, let alone a
lawyer, to act on the basis of such limited information. However, we are talking about danger to a judge. Thus, the court
held that, in fact, the lawyer had a duty. 26 The decision's language is quite interesting, because it is so vague: whenever an
attorney "has a reasonable belief that the threats are 'real,'" the
attorney must communicate the threats. 27 However, the holding is limited to a situation where the threats are made about a
judge. 28 It will be interesting to see whether lawyers struggle
with these issues as much as mental health professionals have.
I continue to wonder whether this analogy is not anomalous,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 366.
See Hansen, 862 P.2d at 118-19.
See id. at 118.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 118-19.
See Hansen, 862 P.2d at 122.
Id.
See id. at 122-23.
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given the very different history, social functions, and claimed
expertise of these two disciplines.
Today, in light of our discussions about domestic violence
and workplace violence predictors, where do we seem to be coming out? Increasingly, we seem to be returning to common
sense, an intuitive or "clinical judgment" approach, one that is
not grounded in statistically sound science. 29 If that is the case,
and if in fact the pendulum is swinging more in the direction of
clinical intuition, and away from social science, then perhaps
the entire edifice of my claim that lawyers should be exempt
from any such responsibility falls, because there is no reason
why lawyers or any other professionals or nonprofessionals
should not be held to a standard of common sense.
PROFESSOR BERNHARD: 30 We have workplace lists and
domestic violence lists. What indicators do we look at? What do
you think of all the lists that we have seen? How are we doing?
DR. STEADMAN: 3 1 I am very troubled. A panel like this is
supposed to bring everybody together, make everybody feel
29. See Janet Johnson et al., Death by Intimacy: Risk Factors for Domestic
Violence, 20 PACE L. REV. 263 (2000); see also Ann Hayes et al., Workplace Violence: Predictionand Prevention, 20 PACE L. REV. 297 (2000). On the willingness of
the general population to engage in "common sense" predictions of dangerousness,
and perception of its relationship to mental illness, see Bruce G. Link et al., Public
Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Dangerousness,and Social Distance,
89 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1328 (1999).
30. Adele Bernhard is an Associate Professor of Law at Pace University
School of Law where she directs the Criminal Defense Clinic. Prior to coming to
Pace, Professor Bernhard created and directed continuing legal education for New
York City's Assigned Counsel Plan Attorneys. Professor Bernhard began her career as a public defender with the Legal Aid Society of New York. She currently
serves on an eight-member Appellate Division Committee which monitors and
evaluates the quality of criminal defense services provided to poor people in the
Bronx and Manhattan.
31. Henry J. Steadman is President of Policy Research Associates, Inc. Dr.
Steadman directed for seventeen years the nationally known research bureau of
the New York State Office of Mental Health. His work has resulted in six books,
over 100 journal articles in a wide range of professional journals, eighteen chapters, and numerous reports. Among Dr. Steadman's current projects are (1) the
National GAINS Center for Persons with Co-occurring Disorders in the Justice
System; (2) the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Violence Risk
Assessment Study; (3) the National Resource Center on Homelessness and Mental
Illness under contract to the Center for Mental Health Services; and (4) the Women and Violence Coordinating Center funded by SAMHSA. In 1987, Dr.
Steadman received the Amicus Award from the American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law. He also received the Philippe Pinel Award from the International

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/5

6

20001 PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS-PARALLELS

321

warm and fuzzy, so you go home feeling as if you had spent your
eight hours productively. I resonate with some of the things Vanessa just said, but with a more critical eye.
PROFESSOR BERNHARD: Well, we would like to hear
your comments.
DR. STEADMAN: There was nothing more important said
today than one of the very first comments that Vanessa made at
the beginning of her remarks, and that is the difference between doing things poorly and being wrong. Whether we are
specifically discussing release decisions from acute psychiatric
hospitalizations, forensic hospitalizations, outpatient commitments, workplace violence, domestic violence or sexual
predators, we are really talking about predicting low base rate
behaviors. 32 There is a mathematical phenomenon that occurs
anytime you try to predict a low base rate behavior (i.e., infrequent sunspots, hurricanes, things that do not happen very
often). 33 Even physical sciences do not make accurate predictions. Most often you are as accurate as the rate of the
phenomenon.
One example of this is parole violations among felons being
released from the prison system. It is pretty easy to be accurate
because felons violate parole fifty-five to seventy percent of the
time. 34 It is harder to predict something that does not happen
very often. For example, Megan's Law35 where approximately
one and a half percent of all the people are in the high-risk
group and there are almost no violations.
Academy of Law and Mental Health in 1988, the Saleem A. Shah Award in 1994
from the State Mental Health Forensic Directors, the 1998 Distinguished Contribution to Forensic Psychology Award from the American Academy of Forensic Psychology, and the 1999 Isaac Ray Award from the American Psychiatric
Association. Dr. Steadman received his B.A. Degree and his M.A. Degree in Sociology from Boston College and his Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
32. See Henry J. Steadman & J.P. Morrissey, Predicting Violent Behavior:A
Cross Validation Study, 61 Soc. FORCES 475-83 (1982).
33. See Henry J. Steadman, Predicting DangerousnessAmong the Mentally
Ill: Art, Magic and Science, 6 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 381-90 (1983).
34. See Henry J. Steadman & J.P. Morrissey, The StatisticalPredictionof Violent Behavior: Measuring the Costs of a PublicProtectionistVersus a Civil Libertarian Model, 5 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 263-74 (1981).
35. See Procedures for Notification, N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-8 (1999).
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What really troubles me is what I would describe as a pretense that the speakers had, with the exception of Patrick
Reilly, who was critiquing what the Legislature did. I feel as if I
am back in the early seventies when I first came out of graduate
school, went to work at the New York State Office of Mental
Health, and started working on a project to assess the accuracy
of psychiatric predictions. In fact, I was trained in medical sociology and I ended up in mental health purely by happenstance
when that was my job assignment. At that time, I read a book
that really influenced me. It was written by Seymour Halleck,
and it was called Psychiatryand the Dilemmas of Crime.3 6 Halleck was a forensic psychiatrist and his book discussed some of
these issues. In 1967, Halleck made a statement that affected
my entire career. He stated that if a psychiatrist or any other
mental professional was asked to show empirical evidence to
support the ability that they can predict violent behavior, none
37
could be offered.
I started doing research in 1970, and it was something that
really shaped my whole career because I could not find a single
study at that point in time where someone had taken actual
predictions and compared them to the behavior of people for
whom the predictions had been made in order to determine the
accuracy of the predictions. In my first study, I found these predictions were about eighty percent wrong and twenty percent
right. 38 Although some people contest my interpretation of the
data, I still stand by it. Most psychiatrists who saw my
presentations and publications attacked me because I questioned whether they should have been making clinical decisions
when they had no empirical basis, no systematic clinical experience, and no idea whether they were wrong or right. 39 My data
suggested that they were wrong four times as often as they

36. See SEYMOUR HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME (1967).
37. See id. at 11.
38. See HENRY J. STEADMAN & J.J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: EXCESSIVE SOCIAL CONTROL OF DEVIANCE (1974).

39. See Henry J. Steadman, Mental Health Law and the Criminal Offender:
Research Directionsfor the 1990's, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 323-37 (1987).
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were right.40 Other literature had also come out stating that
41
they were wrong at least twice as often as they were right.
When I would go to professional meetings, I would see people giving checklists, saying 'I've really ruminated about this,
and I've really given it the best thought that I can, so here is my
list.' To illustrate, I went to a meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law in the early seventies, and a very
well known forensic psychiatrist, Park Deitz, discussed a presentation he made when he was a newly minted psychiatrist. At
his meeting he presented a checklist that he had put together
based on his clinical hunches of what he thought were the best
predictors of future violence by people with mental disorders.
What next happened so frightened him that he tried to collect
the checklists that he had handed out from the twenty-five to
thirty people in the room, and he never once published an article on it. The reason for this was that his audience wanted to
take his checklist, run off, and start using it the next day. It
had no empirical basis except his best thinking, which probably
was very valuable, but left open questions concerning the circumstances in which this list would work. If it worked in Westchester, did it work in the South Bronx, in Harlem, or in
Raleigh, North Carolina? Thus, one of the things that really
concerns me is that when people develop these checklists, while
they can be a very important first step, others are going to use
them as if they produce accurate predictions.
If what Victoria presented on her domestic violence checklist or guidelines for the judges was compiled, it would be used
by the judges to make decisions. 4 2 As a result, it would be used
as a predictive risk assessment tool in those cases, whether or
not that was its intended use.
I argue about Ann Hayes' material, 43 and asked her where
it came from. I believe that the world of workplace violence is
an emerging non-field. I am saying this not against Ann, but
against the burgeoning cadre of consultants in this field. You
40. See id.
41. See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
(1981).
42. See Janet Johnson, et al., Death by Intimacy: Risk Factors for Domestic
Violence, 20 PACE L. REV. 263, 284-85 (2000).
43. See Ann Hayes et. al., Workplace Violence: Predictionand Prevention, 20
PACE L. REV. 297 (2000).
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have consultants making a fortune giving advice on workplace
violence when, empirically, they have little support for what
they are talking about. They do not know how many people had
those same experiences and did not commit workplace violence.
Furthermore, they do not know whether it is different for different types of employees or employers, in different parts of the
country, or, for example, by different racial characteristics. The
employers are so frightened of being sued and being put out of
business, they pay these people millions of dollars a year, and I
do not believe these people are on firm footing at all. In addition, workplace violence research is very difficult because it is
all proprietary information. Employers do not want researchers
coming in and looking at data from their corporations because
they are afraid they are going to get sued with their own data.
As a result it is hard research to do.
I hope that you are very cautious with what you heard today. I do not mean to demean it, because I think the work that
we heard about, particularly Victoria's work in the domestic violence area, are wonderful first steps. However, do not pretend it
will not turn into something you do not intend for it to be because that is what happens. It has happened in other fields,
and it will happen here. So I challenge you to take away from
the conference what was good, but recognize that it is a first
step. Do not pretend it is something that is not.
PROFESSOR BERNHARD: I will just play the devil's advocate for a minute. A response to your critique might be that
the judge is going to have a checklist anyway in his or her mind,
and is going to be using those factors to help make a decision.
Why not work together to come up with a better checklist? The
judge is going to decide who gets the order of protection or who
gets bail. Why not combine the lists that we have drawn from
interviews with victims of domestic violence into one guide?
DR. STEADMAN: That is just what the U.S. Supreme
Court said in Barefoot v. Estelle." The Court held that even if
we agree with all of this omnibus evidence that was presented
indicating that psychiatrists cannot accurately predict future
violent behavior, it is the best we have, so we'll use it anyway. 45
44. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
45. See id.
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Barefoot was a Texas case involving the death penalty. In order
to apply the death penalty in Texas, you have to demonstrate a
propensity for continuing violent behavior. 46 Dr. Devlin, a psychiatrist in a Texas mental hospital, was always called in to testify, and he would always testify that the defendants were
potentially violent. His testimony was very predictable. In
Barefoot, the Supreme Court only considered whether the ex47
pert testimony was valid and held that it was.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The psychiatrist did make a disclaimer, as you suggested, that he could not accurately predict
long-term future behavior and the court said that these predictions were not necessarily a power hold. Yes, the Court accepted the data, but the Court acknowledged that everybody
else in the universe also made these decisions. Judges are
making them every day. Probation officers are making them
every day. Why should we exclude only psychiatrists from being able to make these predictions? Death penalty cases are different, and the weight of expert testimony obviously plays a
different role. We were obviously upset about that kind of prediction, especially when Tarasoff8 started to come back to
haunt us. In California, if you make a Tarasoff warning and
then the patient kills the person, the psychiatrist is called back
at the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial to show that this was
premeditated because he knew about it and had made a
49
warning.
PROFESSOR MERTON: Subsequently, the psychiatrist
may get sued because of his or her testimony. That was what I
anticipated at the time of the Tarasoff decision, when we heard
tremendous outcry from the American Psychiatric Association
saying, 'No, no, we psychiatrists can't do this' (predict violence).
Dr. Steadman's research was heavily relied on to establish that
point. Yet, every day in courtrooms and mental hospitals across
America, psychiatrists take oaths and render opinions on the
likelihood of future violent behavior. That willingness to make
the predictions, despite the dearth of empirical evidence validating their predictions, is the foundation of Tarasoffliability. I
46.
47.
48.
49.

See
See
See
See

id. at 883-84.
id. at 893-96.
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
id.
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was arguing for a somewhat radical step: that psychiatrists refuse to, and acknowledge that they cannot, make such predictions with any greater or lesser accuracy than the judges,
jurors, parole boards, etc., who desperately want them to make
the predictions, so as to get the real decision-makers off the
hook. Society would then have to find another mechanism to
make these determinations, perhaps the far more imperfect
mechanism of the average Family Court judge, who is operating, I can assure you, with very little familiarity with any of
these factors that have been discussed today as predictors of violence. Someone cannot be committed to a mental hospital
based on my opinion that he is dangerous. Both as a current
prosecutor and as a former defense lawyer, there have been
many situations where I have been as positive as I could possibly be that someone was going to commit future violence, and in
many cases it turned out that I was right. However, I have no
power in our legal system to do anything about it. Only the psychiatrists do.
DR. STEADMLAN: Well, let me give you the second half of
that because I do not want to be as negative about the process
that you talked about. I think it is important to be honest about
what the process is. For example, take Victoria's study which I
think is empirically based, although she does not give herself
credit. She has taken some literature, and various personal experiences, and by tapping the people in this broad audience, she
is going beyond the experiences of a few people and bringing
others in. I think that is the first step.
Next, I think, you have to have a two-part commitment.
One step in the right direction is to admit that it is our best
informed judgment based upon personal experience that has
been carefully contemplated. It goes beyond a single person sitting on the bench just making his or her best guess, so it is a
good first step. Next there then has to be a commitment to take
another step, not to see that as the end, but in fact to test it, and
do more research. It may not be a massive NIH-funded research project, but you have to take the ideas, really challenge
them, and test them to see if they work in other places.
PROFESSOR BERNHARD: It is important for us to look
at how the checklists are being used. I think there is a difference between presenting a set of factors to a judge who is mak-
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ing a decision about whether to issue an order of protection in
one case, and the legislature in New Jersey coming out with a
list of supposed predictors of sexual offender recidivists and
stamping that on a group of people who will be marked and affected by that stamp forever. Therefore, the latter will have an
enormous effect on a huge group of people.
Another area that previous panelists have discussed earlier
today is the continuing effect of the Tarasoff-0 decision. In other
words, do psychiatrists and psychologists feel more pressured to
warn? Do they feel more inhibited about making predictions
while the rest of the world is feeling more confident about making predictions? Has there been a seesaw effect? So, I would
like to turn that question over to Dr. Rogge.
DR. ROGGE:5 1 I would say that all New York State mental
health practitioners-psychiatrists included feel more of a
"pressure" to warn threatened third parties when confronted
with a Tarasoff situation in their offices, in which their patient
directly threatens harm to the third party. This is true whether
they are seeing the patient in an inpatient, outpatient clinic, or
private practice office setting. Ironically, the therapist's "duty
to warn" is often perceived as a mandatory obligation in spite of
the fact that no New York State statute or case law has ever
explicitly recognized Tarasoff. Practitioners nevertheless perceive it to be the commonly practiced standard of care, and are
thus understandably fearful of incurring malpractice liability if
they do not act as if Tarasoff applied in New York State.
While the New York courts have not decided a Tarasoff
case, many other jurisdictions have not only recognized
Tarasoff, but applied its principles in an ever-expanding set of
clinical situations.5 2 Conversely, a few jurisdictions have re50. See id.
51. Dr. Rogge is an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at Albert Einstein College of Medicine and Associate Director of the Law and Psychiatry Fellowship program. He currently serves as Director of Psychiatry at North Central Bronx
Hospital and is Associate Chair of the Department of Psychiatry for the North
Bronx Healthcare Network. He is board-certified in forensic psychiatry and is Director of the Assisted Outpatient Treatment Program for the Bronx established
under Kendra's Law. Dr. Rogge is a graduate of Albany Medical College (M.D.)
and Rutgers Law School (J.D.).
52. See Schrempf v. State, 487 N.E.2d 883, 884 (N.Y. 1985).
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fused to adapt Tarasoff,53 or even rejected its reasoning
outright.54
It is difficult to predict the impact of this divergent line of
"Tarasoffprogeny" case law on psychiatric practice. Besides engendering confusion and anxiety among New York State clinicians, they increasingly feel a "pressure" to warn and protect
threatened third parties in more questionable cases. For example, when a patient in anger threatens harm to a third party,
the therapist is more prone to "play it safe" and issue a warning, rather than rely on the patient's subsequent explanation or
retraction of the threat. How this form of defensive medicine
has affected patient care is unclear.
Professor Merton suggests that psychiatrists have brought
this "pressure" upon themselves, and created their Tarasoffvulnerability, by claiming that they have special expertise in predicting dangerousness in their patients. 55 The psychiatrists
benefit financially and otherwise when they testify as forensic
experts as to the likely future dangerousness of parties before
the court. Have they not invited the judiciary to take their
claims of predictive power seriously, and thereby to impose obligations upon them to use their predictive powers to warn and
protect the public in Tarasoff situations?
I take issue with Professor Merton's underlying premise:
That a duty to respond, warn, or otherwise intervene is being
imposed by courts on psychiatrists and other professionals in
Tarasoffsituations because of their perceived expertise or abilities in predicting dangerousness. It is true that the Tarasoff
court placed a new affirmative duty on therapists to take reasonable steps to warn or protect third parties from their patients' threats to harm them. 56 The rationale for this
reconceptualization of common law tort obligation is convoluted
and controversial, and has been the subject of much legal discussion. 57 But one thing seems clear-it was not based on the
belief that psychiatrists can predict dangerous behavior in their
53. See Schrempf v. State, 486 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985).
54. See Schrempf, 487 N.E.2d at 884, 886.
55. See Merton, supra note 2.
56. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
57. See, e.g., Cain v. Rijken, 717 P.2d 140, 146 n.8 (Or. 1986) (en bane) (noting
that "Tarasoffhas inspired many law review articles and case notes"); see also Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REv. 97, 101 n.14 (1994).
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patients, and therefore should be held accountable for this
behavior.
The Tarasoff court instead based its decision on a "special
relationship" analysis. 5 In traditional common law, parties
have no affirmative duty to protect others from threatened
harm, unless they are in a "special relationship" with either the
threatening or the threatened party.5 9 The Tarasoff court held
that the therapist-patient relationship was such a "special relationship" which justified invoking such an affirmative duty on
the therapist. 60 The Court did not explain why the therapeutic
relationship should qualify as such a "special relationship."
Most legal scholars 61 have argued that a combination of factors
led the Court to its conclusion: (1) the therapist has special
knowledge (of the threat) unknown to the potential target; (2)
the therapist has a unique capacity to assess the seriousness of
the threat-i.e., to predict the patient's actual dangerousness to
the potential target-because of his training and his contact with
the patient; (3) the therapist has the ability to take charge or
control of the threatening patient (e.g., by initiating hospitalization proceedings), or at least to warn the threatened party,
fairly, easily, and with little risk to the therapist; (4) the therapist's liability for inaccurate predictions or insufficient interventions could be fairly contained by limiting liability to
"foreseeable" and "readily identifiable" victims; and (5) ther62
apists are covered by malpractice insurance.
Lest I appear unfairly critical of the New York State judiciary, let me make one last point. While New York's Court of Appeals has never decided a Tarasoff case, and thus left mental
health practitioners in a state of uncertainty, the highest court
58. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
59. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965)).
60. See id.
61. See Lake, supra note 57, at 97; John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers:Some ObservationsAbout the Current State of Common Law
Affirmative Duties to Aid or ProtectOthers, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 867 (1991); James P.
Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 147
(1980).
62. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342. Justice Tobriner lists 7 major considerations which he restates as: (1) foreseeability; (2) degree of certainty that plaintiffs
injury occurred; (3) closeness of conduct and injury; (4) moral blame; (5) the policy
of preventing future harm; (6) burden and consequences of imposing a duty on
defendant and community; and (7) insurance cost, availability, and prevalence.
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should be recognized for its decision in Schrempf v. State,63
which in my opinion addresses a far more common situation
that therapists face, while giving us a preview as to how the
highest court might approach a Tarasoff case in the future.
In Schrempf the defendant psychiatrist was treating a patient with a long history of chronic psychotic mental illness and
violent behavior. 64 The patient was being seen in a state hospital outpatient clinic and treated with antipsychotic
65
medication.
One day the psychiatrist received word that the patient had
stopped taking his medications a week previously. The psychiatrist saw the patient in session and could not detect any signs of
clinical deterioration. The patient had not threatened or been
violent towards anyone. The patient claimed that he stopped
his medication because it made him too sleepy, a common side
effect. The psychiatrist lowered the dose of the patient's medication, then referred him to a vocational rehabilitation center
for more regular day program follow-up. The psychiatrist maintained contact with the patient's counselor at the center and
other professionals involved in the patient's care to monitor his
66
progress.
This is a common outpatient approach in such clinical situations, where a high-risk patient has become non-compliant
63. 487 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 1985).
64. See id. at 885. The patient was variously diagnosed as manic depressive,
or more rarely, paranoid schizophrenic. His long psychiatric history included six
hospitalizations in the previous two years due to violent altercations with his family, property damage, and attempted assaults, but not personal injury, which the
patient claimed were in response to inner voices. His hospitalizations were often
on a voluntary legal status, as he resented involuntary admission and sometimes
responded with violent threats or resistance toward hospital staff. In the summer
of 1981 he broke windows in his mother's house, pleaded guilty to criminal mischief, and was sentenced to probation.
65. See id. The patient's last involuntary hospitalization was in January,
1981, and his last voluntary hospitalization was in September, 1981. Upon discharge he was assigned to a special clinic for recalcitrant outpatients due to his
poor history of medication compliance. He was also referred by his probation officer to a vocational rehabilitation center, which he began attending on a trial basis
in November, 1981. Throughout this period his outpatient clinic attendance and
medication adherence diminished.
66. See id. at 885-86. The psychiatrist monitored her patient's behavior
through his probation officer, his vocational rehabilitation counselor and other outpatient clinic staff. They reported finding no evidence that the patient's condition
was deteriorating.
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and thus is at increased risk for relapse, but has not threatened
anyone or otherwise become acutely dangerous to self or others.
In spite of the inherent potential for future violence, therapists
often choose less restrictive alternatives than rehospitalization
in an effort to re-engage the patient in longer-term treatment.
These interventions may even be contrary to generally accepted
community practice-such as lowering the medication dose of a
paranoid patient who actually needs an increased dose, but is
refusing, in order to increase patient trust and build a more collaborative therapeutic alliance, so that the patient will be more
receptive to medication increases in the future. In many cases
this longer-term and more patient-centered approach proves
fruitful in the long run.
Tragically, in Schrempf the outcome was the very opposite.
The patient went to his day program appointment a few weeks
later and killed one of the staff members in an apparently sudden, unpredictable act. It is unclear from the facts whether the
patient knew his victim, and whether he was high on drugs and!
67
or acutely manic or psychotic at the time.
The victim's widow sued the state and the psychiatrist for
wrongful death, based on allegations of tort malpractice. The
Court of Claims found for the widow, ruling that the psychiatrist should have "done something more" in view of the patient's
68
history when she learned he was not taking his medication.
69
The Appellate Division affirmed.
The State appealed, arguing that the psychiatrist had no
special relationship with the victim which justified imposing liability, and that the psychiatrist had acted within the area of
her professional medical judgment.7 0 The Court of Appeals
agreed, unanimously reversed the lower court decision, and dis71
missed the widow's claim.
In an opinion written by Chief Judge Wachtler, the highest
Court reasoned that the plaintiff was not required to establish a
"special relationship" between the state and the victim, where
the state was engaged in a proprietary function (like providing
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 886.
Schrempf, 487 N.E.2d at 884, 886.
Schrempf v. State, 486 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985).
Schrempf, 487 N.E.2d at 884.
id.
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medical or psychiatric care) rather than a governmental function (like providing police or fire protection).7 2 Thus the state
had the same duty of care to the victim as a private facility or
73
individual.
The Court acknowledged that this duty of care was particularly difficult to define in psychiatric cases. 74 First, competing
state interests are involved: to humanely care for the mentally
ill individuals in the community, on the one hand, while protecting society from them, on the other. 75 Second, psychiatry is
"an inexact science." 76 Thus, clinical decisions in psychiatry in77
volve a calculated risk, about which experts might disagree.
For this reason a broader application of the "professional judgment" rule is indicated. In the Court's words:
"These circumstances necessarily broaden the area of professional judgment to include treatments tailored to the particular
case, where the 'accepted procedure' does not take into account
factors which the treating physician could reasonably consider
Ts
significant. [Citations omitted]."
Applying these principles to the case at hand, 79 the Court
noted that the patient was a voluntary outpatient, so that the
psychiatrist's duty to prevent him from harming others was
more limited due to his relative lack of control over the patient.
Upon learning that the patient was not taking his medications,
the psychiatrist personally evaluated him, referred him to a day
program, and continued to monitor his progress via his probation officer and his day program counselor, who reported that he
remained stable. Based on this information, and her knowledge
of this patient's particular history, she made the clinical judgment that the patient was not clinically deteriorating, and even
improving off his medications. She felt that a more aggressive
approach (such as forcing involuntary hospitalization upon him)
posed a significant risk of inducing a relapse and imminent violence, while a less aggressive and more collaborative approach
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 886.
See id.
See id. at 887.
See Schrempf, 487 N.E.2d at 888.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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(with close monitoring) posed increased chances of fostering her
patient's trust and treatment adherence.
In this situation, the Court pointed out that even the experts disagreed about what steps the psychiatrist should take,
as "there were risks either way." 80 Given this fact, although in
hindsight the psychiatrist's calculation of relative risks (and
prediction of future violence) was mistaken, the Court concluded that "it must be recognized as an exercise of professional
judgment for which [the psychiatrist and] the state cannot be
held responsible."8 '
The Court's decision and reasoning in Schrempf reflects an
informed and sophisticated appreciation of the inherent difficulties in managing the care of psychiatric patients. The therapists often find themselves in a clinical "Catch-22" situation,
where all available options pose risks. New York's highest
court has justifiably laid down a "professional judgment" standard in Schrempf which allows therapists some flexibility in
making clinical decisions based on individual patient considerations, without being held to the more stringent "common local
practice" standard of care.
In my opinion the Schrempf decision and its reasoning
gives us the most promising advance look at how New York's
highest court will likely view a Tarasoff case which comes
before it in the future. The court would likely rely on the "professional judgment" standard enunciated in Schrempf in deciding a Tarasoff case and allow the therapist greater latitude in
deciding whether to warn or take other steps to protect the
threatened third party, given all the considerations presented
by the particular case.
New York State psychiatrists and other mental health professionals would be well advised to read the Schrempf decision
carefully. Perhaps they need not be so anxious and feel such
pressure after all when facing a Tarasoff situation in their
clinical practice.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just want to go back for a minute
to the Family Court judge and the order of protection. If, for
80. Schrempf, 487 N.E.2d at 888.
81. Id. at 889.
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example, the checklist was limited to empirically based research, would it then be reliable or helpful? Is that enough?
DR. STEADMAN: No. I do not think one could merely say,
'Judge, here are some guidelines that were created that are empirically based on our front line practice in the domestic violence area and people we have talked to.' Beyond that there is
an obligation to actually look at the decisions that the judges
make using these checklists to see if it migrates to other places.
Additionally, if other judges start to use it, there is an obligation to watch and track the decisions that they make. Are they
making the decisions that would be suggested? When they
make decisions that are different from what the guidelines
would suggest, are theirs equally correct? How do we modify it?
Without tracking, we do not know if they are making better decisions. I think that anyone who creates these checklists has
the obligation to find ways of tracking their use, seeing whether
they work in the way he or she thinks they are going to, and, if
they do not, refining them.
PROFESSOR MERTON: The reason we need to do this is
that these judges rely heavily on experts for every type of decision, not just in domestic violence situations. For example, they
make many custody decisions that involve predictions of violence or sexual abuse, in which the forensic expert is heavily
relied upon. As Dr. Steadman says, there is no tracking of the
outcomes of these decisions, no analysis of the validity of the
judges' decisions. The judges are just going to apply any guidelines you provide. I agree with Dr. Steadman, that is what
scares me.
But when you turn to the subject of intuition, there is another problem. Those who work with domestic violence victims
have always said that we must trust the victim; that she usually does have good, sound intuition regarding the timing of the
next violent act, and anecdotally, this perception has proven accurate. At least the victim who has lived with and been abused
by a partner for a long time seems able to analyze the violent
partner's micro-behaviors, perhaps not explicitly in terms of a
checklist, but globally and holistically, and predict the next outbreak of violence, albeit too often with false negatives. I think
that has been accurate. In this sense, a victim's intuition may
be as reliable as a psychiatrist's purported expertise.
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DR. STEADMAN: Checklists may inform, but they must
be checked out and refined because they may give you a partial
answer that is not an answer for everyone or is not the same
answer all the time.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is also for Dr.
Steadman. I was curious about your criticism of Dr. Websdale's
suggestion that sometimes you have to use common sense. You
pointed out that the checklist does not include all the information or truth that there is. I am wondering why you responded
so negatively to the idea that sometimes we have to fill in those
blanks with common sense. If checklists cannot give us all the
information we need, why shouldn't we take our best shot at
filling in the gaps with our common sense, including our experiences with battered women, or the people whose lives we are
trying to affect?
DR. STEADMAN: Because when you rely on common
sense, it is often wrong. Furthermore, you need to know when
it is wrong and when it is right. If you just take one's informed
common sense, and compare it to someone else who is either
doing research or is a clinician, the two may differ. Whose common sense is better? We do not know.
PROFESSOR MERTON: I have two quick points. First,
the idea of doing any kind of follow-up research to validate, e.g.,
judicial predictions, is almost inherently impossible because
they are intervening in the situation. How are you going to figure out whether or not the judges are missing a lot of positives
or finding a lot of false negatives? If the judge issues the protection order and intervenes in that situation, it changes the variables and makes it impossible to figure out whether or not the
violence would have occurred if the judge had not made the intervention. The same is true if the judge fails to issue the order.
This is a serious methodological problem in trying to validate,
or invalidate, the decisions that judges make based on intuition
and/or "checklists."
My other point concerns the pedophile case we talked about
earlier.8 2 For example: what would I do in the Clinic if one of
82. See Linda C. Fentiman et al., Current Issues in the Psychiatrist-Patient
Relationship: Outpatient Civil Commitment, Psychiatrist Abandonment and the
Duty to Continue Treatment of PotentiallyDangerousPatients-BalancingDuties to
Patientsand the Public, 20 PACE L. REv. 231, 232-33 (2000).
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my law student-attorneys who was interested in acting as a law
guardian taking care of children in the legal system confided in
me as an attorney that he had had legal problems with
pedophilic behavior? Or perhaps, even just pedophilic fantasies? I have a very visceral and common sense reaction to this
scenario. Putting myself in the role of a professional who is trying to make a clinical judgment about whether or not to intervene, I am troubled by the fact that I come back to the limits of
my expertise. In fact, I do not feel adequately prepared to make
those kinds of judgments in the absence of some kind of science.
On the other hand, science may be telling us that this is something that is too difficult for human beings to do. Yet, do we
have the luxury of making no decisions at all? As Professor
Bernhard pointed out, one way or the other, these decisions will
get made. Today, we end up with judges having to act without
the benefit of research, and without the benefit of that obligation. As people who educate the people who are going to be
working on these cases and making these decisions in the future, we have a very important responsibility to at least equip
everyone we train with a lot of skepticism about the validity of
these predictions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I want to defend the checklist to
the degree that I think it broadens the range of things to which
judges need to be alerted. New York has, within the last few
years, required that judges consider domestic violence when assigning custody.8 3 One would have thought that was a nobrainer, but in fact, it could not be done until the New York
State law was changed.84 To the extent that we can take off the
blinders and alert judges to the fact that there are things that
need to be looked at, I think we are doing something with the
checklists, even if we cannot predict dangerousness with
accuracy.
PROFESSOR MERTON: Then maybe we do not need psychiatrists in the process at all. The real question I have to pose
to the psychiatrists here is "Do you or do you not have this capacity, this expertise? Does it have a scientific, empirical basis
or not?" If yes, than Tarasoffrequires you to exercise it respon83. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 240 (1) (McKinney 1999).

84. See id.
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sibly. If not, there is a temptation to say please get out of our
courtrooms.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have two responses to some of the
domestic violence issues and questions which you might address, Dr. Steadman. First, I think in some ways domestic violence is very different from the other issues we have discussed.
In many of the other areas, you are talking about very uncommon kinds of events. While domestic homicide is a rare event,
domestic violence is not. That makes it somewhat different
from other kinds of behaviors we are talking about.
In fact, domestic violence is not a series of incidents or violent incidents that happen over a period of time, but an ongoing
pattern of behavior that may be punctuated by violent episodes.
So again, predicting the continuation of domestic violence (not
necessarily homicides), is a very different ball game than predicting some of these other, rare, uncommon offenses. I am
wondering how an understanding of the context of domestic violence as an ongoing pattern and the understanding of the frequency of domestic violence affects your view as to what we can
do regarding some of these assessments.
DR. STEADMAN: You have made very good points, and
my answer would be that I would be much more optimistic
about the possible success of doing it in those instances because
it is so much more frequent.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would just like to say one thing.
In the field of domestic violence research, the approach that you
can control this variable and that variable, that you can identify
and pin-point specific kinds of behaviors, that we can relate scientifically as dependent/independent variables, is part of the
problem rather than part of the solution. If you look at what we
knew twenty or thirty years ago about variables concerning domestic violence, you would find that we knew incredibly little.
We did not have the data. When the police would respond to a
scene, they did not do anything; they did not log it. Our data
today is different.
I would suggest to you that positivistic, scientific approaches to the study of that issue, or indeed many issues involving predicting violence, are deeply problematic, and that is
one of my objections to the issue of prediction as a whole. It is
riddled with problems. The idea that you can say one approach
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is wrong and imply that with the right techniques that we can
arrive at the truth, I think, is very dangerous.
DR. STEADMAN: I would not put us in a contest. I think
ethnographers, sociologists, psychologists and psychiatrists
need to collaborate on teams. I believe that one of the weaknesses of the MacArthur data85 is that we do not have a perceptual, contextual understanding of the violent incidents. Also, I
think that you need to have an empirical, more positivistic approach and to be more systematic. Otherwise, you end up just
relying on clinical lore, which does not give you a lot of
confidence.
PROFESSOR MERTON: There is another issue which has
not been raised. Should we be broadening the groups of people
who are subjected to the Tarasoff requirement? Why is it the
psychiatrists alone who suffer from this responsibility? They
are not the only people involved in making clinical assessments.
We ask many people to do this. I do not know how well they do
it or whether we ought to hold them responsible, but what about
the police officer who does an investigation or goes to the house
of a domestic violence victim and does not do anything; or the
physician who sees that victim in the emergency room and does
not intervene to prevent further violence, which may be highly
predictable? Perhaps the conversation should be expanded to
include all of those people who end up involved in all the various aspects of predicting dangerousness, and whose "predictions," whether explicit or implicit, become the basis for
decisions to intervene or not.

85. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People DischargedFrom Acute
Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PsYcHiATY
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